2. The Dutch factory on Hirado (1609-1641) and the removal to Deshima (June 1641).
The Dutch trade on Hirado (also called Firando) was not very profitable during the first years, because the quantity of goods imported was too small. In 1613 the English also established a factory on the island, wich would remain in being till 1623. In accordance with the Dutch-English treaty of June 2nd, 1619, coöperation existed between the two factories, wich is manifested in the archive by resolutions of the combined ship's Councils and both Chiefs.
See inv.nr. 3.
Although the Shogun in 1617 restricted the overseas trade to the harbours of Nagasaki and Hirado, the Dutch received a new act of safe-conduct on their journey to the Shogunal Court of that year, wich passport guaranteed them free entrance in all Japanese ports.
See inv.nr. 1b. The much-used term 'trade-passport' for these documents is thus - strictly taken - incorrect. Cf. Nachod, p. 170-171. See also inv.nr. 2, which letter has indeed the character of a grant of free trade.
The efforts of both the English and the Dutch to capture the richly-laden Portuguese carracks and Chinese junks, sailing from and to Nagasaki, led to a sharp reprimand of the Japanese Government in 1621.
Corpus, I, p. 172-174.
The Shogunal Government, on the other hand, became more and more opposed to the Portuguese, because of their missionary activity. The Shogun believed that the existing order in Japan was endangered by the expanding Christian religion. After the revolt of Japanese Christians on the promontory of Shimabara (east of Nagasaki) in 1637 and 1638 the Portuguese were duly expelled from the Empire (1639), the Dutch had to demolish their newly-built wharehouse on Hirado (1640) and in 1641 the removal of the factory to Deshima was ordered. The Portuguese had been confined on this artificially constructed islet in the harbour of Nagisaki from 1636 to 1639. It was built in 1634 and 1635 through the contributions of 25 local merchants.
Goodman, p.14; Boxer,The great ship, p. 146
The Dutch factory remained here until theclosing-down in 1860. From 1639 to 1854 the Dutch were the only Europeans permitted to enter japan. The Spanish had been expelled already in 1624: the English abandoned their factory voluntarily in 1623 and were not admitted again until 1854, although they tried several times to reopen the trade. Together with the Chinese, the Dutch provided for the overseas trade of Japan, because in 1636 the Shogun finally forbade the Japanese to go abroad, after a series of restricting measures in the years 1633-1636.
Cf. Boxer,The Christian Century, especially p. 372. For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned, that Siamese envoys and trade ships occasionally visited Japan during the period of seclusion, and that there was trade with Korea through the Tsushima Island (North of Kiushu). Cf. Iwao, p. 1 and passim.
The removal to Deshima took place in June 1641. A short time after the establishment, in August 1641, the Chief of the factory received a letter from the Governor of Nagasaki, in which were promulgated a number of very onerous regulations and restrictions concerning the residence of the Dutch on the island.
Corpus, I, p. 356-358.
These and others regulations remained in force practically unaltered until the closing-down of the facory.
4. The government of Nagasaki. The relations between the Japanese Authorities and the Dutch on Deshima.
The port of Nagasaki, where from 1641 onwards all foreign traffic wasconcentrated, stood, as has been previously said, under direct control of theBakufu.
Cf. for the following: Feenstra Kuiper, p. 87 seq.; Goodman p. 44 seq., Boxer,Jan Compagnie, Ch. IV.
The central government was represented by two governors, 'Bugyo'
'Bugyo': 'Bringer of gifts': magistrate appointed by the central government.
, who resided alternately in the capital. The Dutch called them "Gouverneurs", whilst they had various names for the subordinate officials: "Bongiozen" or "Banjozen" (derived from the word 'Banjo-shu'). There was also a council of town elders, 'Toshiyorishu', 'Machi-doshiyori', proceeding from the local landowners. (Dutch: "Stadsburgemeesters").
Every member in turn was at the head of affairs during one year. Jap.:'Nemban'; Dutch: "Opperburgemeester" or "Rapporteur Burgemeester"). The town of Nagasaki was divided into quarters, each quarter controlled by an'Otona'. Deshima constituted a seperated quarter under the guidance of threeOtona, who alternated every day at noon. The interpreters were formed into a sort of guild or college ("het Collegie" they call themselves for short in their translations) with a maximum strength of 150, seniors and apprentices together. "Though their positions dated from the Dutch factory at Hirado, their systematic ranks seen to have emerged in the Nagasaki-Deshima era... Theinterpreters combined the jobs of linguist, commercial agent and spy".
Goodman, p.47.
After 1695, seven senior interpreters under the leadership of a 'metsuke' formed a College of Head Interpreters. (Dutch : "Collegie van Oppertolken"). These eight persons signed and stamped the engrossments and translations of nearly all documents that were exchanged between the Dutch and the Japanese authorities. Apart from these "Gouverneurs, banjozen, burgemeesters, opper- en ondertolken, ottenaas, ende dwarskijckers" the Dutch had to deal with the purveyors of the victuals for the factory
The so-called "compradoors". The word is derived from the Portuguese "comprador": "buyer".
, the cooks,servants, fireguard, gate-keepers, coolies etc. All were paid or given gifts bythe Company, wich thus provided a living for an important part of the inhabitants of Nagasaki.
Cf. Nachod, p. 421.
All contact with Japanese officials must be maintained through the interpreters. The majority of the Company's servants thus acquired only a scanty knowledge of the Japanese language, wich was further impeded on the part of the Opperhoofden by their annual change in office.
See the next paragraph.
Moreover, the Bakufu generally thwarted the efforts of Dutch and Japanese alike to establish a closer contact outside the commercial sphere. Therefore the Governors-General at Batavia mostly used Chinese language in their letters to the Shogun, the Imperial Council or the Nagasaki Governors.
Cf. inv.nrs. 638-639.
In this way there was greater certainty that the contents would reach their destination in the original form and meaning, not being mistranslated by the interpreters.
In the 17th century the interpreters often had an insufficient command of the Dutch language, which caused much trouble and annoyance on both sides. Of course, the total absence of dictionaries ond other expedients made the task of the interpreters a difficult one. After about 1670, things change for the better: on 15 December 1670 the interpreters are recorded to be exercising in Dutch handwriting and in 1671 the Governor orders the intruction of interpreters on Deshima.
Goodman, p. 50.
The daily entrance of 9 November 1673 contains the following passage: "The interpreters come to inform us that the Governor has decided and ordered that a certain Japanese boy, about ten or twelve years old, will come here daily on the island, in order to learn Dutch from one of the Company's servants, as likewise to be taught how to read and write the same."
Inv.nr. 87, fol. 4-5. Engl. translated. from Boxer, Jan Compagnie, p. 60.
5. The personnel of the factory.
By a regulation of 7 June 1678, Governor-General and Council decided that the personnel of the factory should consist of a merchant, a second merchant, two or three undermerchants and fourteen or fifteen assistants (a surgeon and his assistant included).
Plakaatboek, III, p. 5.
The merchant bore the title of "Opperhoofd" (Chief); he held a seat in the Council of Justice at Batavia every period when he was out of office.
Regulation G.-G. and Council, 9 July 1672. Plakaatboek, II, p. 558-559. The Japanese called the Opperhoofd 'Oranda Kapitan', i.e. Dutch Captain. ("Hollandse Kapitein" in the translation of the interpreters).
In 1640 the Japanese demanded that a new Opperhoofd should be appointed every year. This gave rise to a system of rotation, by which every Opperhoofd held the highest post of the factory three to four times. In 1790, the Director-General of the trade, Johannes Siberg, succeeded in obtaining approval for a longer stay.
The Council of the factory consisted of the Opperhoofd, the second merchants and the undermerchants. Since 1764, the scribe (at the same time bookkeeper and wharehouse custodian) attended the meetings of the Council and also signed the resolutions.
Resolution of G.-G. and Council, 16 April 1764; Realia, II, p. 46.
The scribe had the power to pass notarial and secretarial instruments and to confirm sworn testimonies. Initially, he had the rank of an assistant, later on - as wharehouse custodian-book-keeper-scribe - of an undermerchant.
After the dissolution of the Company in February 1796, no great changes occurred regarding the number, the task and the competence of the inhabitants of Deshima. Sometime between 1796 and 1816, the Council, taking resolutions independently within the limits of their instructions from G.-G. and Council, dissapeared; after 1816, the Opperhoofd decided alone. The title "Opperhoofd" changed into "Gouvernmentskommissaris voor Japan" (Government Commissioner for Japan) in 1855 and since 1859 the representative of the Netherlands was also Consul-General for Japan and Political Agent of the Netherlands in Japan. The last Opperhoofd, J.H. Donker Curtius, who bore each of these titles in turn, signed the first treaty between the Netherlands and Japan in 1856.
Wijnaendts van Resandt, p. 177-178; in this book is given a name-list of the Opperhoofden of the 17th and 18th centuries with biographical notes, not without mistakes. Cf. also the Appendix of this inventory. Cf. van Kleffens, annex III, for the text of the treaty of 30 January 1856.
6. The journeys to the Shogunal Court.
At their arrival in Japan the Dutch obtained the privilege to be received in audience by the Shogun every year. (This was never granted to the Chinese). On the occasion of the "hofreis" (journey to the (Shogunal) Court) the most important government authorities were honoured with gifts. The privilege became an onerous duty in the course of years, on account of the high expenditure and the burdensome journey, wich was relieved so far in 1790, that the journey only needed to be made every fourth year. The gifts, however, must be brought every year. When the Opperhoofd did not make the journey himself, these gifts were carried to Edo by a group of interpreters. In 1720 and 1783 no journey was made, because no ships arrived from Batavia in the previous year and therefore no gifts could be made. The number of journeys from 1633 (the first year of which a daily journal of the factory is preserved) to 1850 amounts to 186.
Until 1649 the scribe accompanied the Opperhoofd to the Edo Court; from that year on the surgeon of the factory always joined the travelling party. This was frequently consulted by the physicians of the court. The small party of Dutchmen was accompanied by a host of Japanese officials, interpreters, servants, outriders, porters of the Opperhoofd's 'norimono' (palanquin), etc. The Opperhoofd had the rank and status of a daimyo during the whole journey (indispensable for a person recieved in audience by the Shogun) and was treated as such on his way to the capital. The expedition took 12 to 13 weeks in all during the first half of the 17th century from the beginning of December till the beginning of March, after about 1660 from the middle of February till the end of May. A few days after the arrival in Edo the Shogun granted an audience, followed by a more informal meeting and several visits to members of the Bakufu. After a sojourn of 2 or 3 weeks the visitors set out on the journey back, supplied with the traditional present made in return: thirty silk kimono's ("Keyserlijcke rokken"); (Imperial Gowns). The expedition went partly by land (Nagasaki - Strait of Shimonoseki; -Osaka - Edo), partly by sea (Strait of Shimonoseki - Osaka). The total distance covered was over 2000 kilometers.
7. The managing of business at the factory.
The yearly routine at the factory was determined by the arrival and the departure of ships. At the end of June two or three ships left from Batavia and sailed with the south-western monsoon to Japan in four or five weeks. This was the case at least in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 17th century the ships often sailed via Siam, Tonking etc. to take on trade-goods there. With these ships the new Opperhoofd also came to Japan. Therefore two Opperhoofden were at the factory during the trade-season, from about 15 August till the end of October. At the end of October or the middle of November the accounts were closed, the resigning Opperhoofd instructed his successor
A number of these so-called "Memories van overgave" ('Memoirs of surrender', i.e. to the successor in office) have been preserved in inv.nrs. 31-45. Cf. also inv.nr. 659.
, and the ships left for Batavia with the north-eastern monsoon. With the Opperhoofd, the second merchant and some of the undermerchants and assistants also returned to Batavia, as they only were needed at the factory during the busy trade-season. During the voyage the report on trade since October of the past year was written or finished. Around New Year one arrived at Batavia. The voyage back often took more time than the outward voyage, because one had to reckon not only with the monsoon but also with the Japanese prescriptions concerning the date of departure. On Deshima, in the meantime, preparations were made for the journey to Edo (Nov.- Febr.); during that trip (Febr.- May) an undermerchant took the place of the Opperhoofd. From May the middle of August the factory was put in readiness for the next trade-season; sometimes a remnantsale was held.
In the 1840's the factory more or less changed from a trade-station into a sort of pre-diplomatic residence.
Cf. van Kleffens, p. 22-23.
Trade was at that time of minor importance, the more so when compared with that of the previous centuries. For the Netherlands, the factory became a means to procure the opening of Japan for foreign nations; for Japan, it was - as it had been since 1639 - the only channel through which filtered the news from the Western world.
Cf. e.g. inv.nrs. 1749-1758.
The letter of King William II to the Shogun, sent by way of H.M.S. "Palembang" in 1844, in wich the King gave the assurance that the opening of Japan would be beneficial for Japan and the outer world alike, exemplifies the changed attitude on the part of the Dutch.
The answer of the Shogun accompanied by some costly presents, was cordial but negative; cf. inv.nrs. 1707-1716.
In 1847 and after, the Opperhoofd played a mediating and infomative part in the negotiations between Japan and the foreign nations.
Cf. inv.nrs. 1688-1717; Van Kleffens, p. 31-39 and van der Chijs, passim.
8. The Dutch trade with Japan.
The different trade-systems, wich were used on Hirado and Deshima in the course of two and a half centuries, have been described in detail by Nachod, Feenstra Kuiper, Meylan, Lauts, van der Chijs and others. Therefore only some main characteristics, especially those with a bearing on the archive, will be mentioned here. Until 1628 the Japan trade of the United Company has not been hampered by any limitations from the side of the Japanese authorities. After a four-year period, during which trade practically came to a standstill - caused by the doings of the Governor of Formosa, Pieter Nuyts - in 1628(-26) it was restricted more and more by Japanese prescriptions, such as export-embargoes, fixations of maximum amounts and prices, conditional sales, etc.
After 1725 the "Keizerlijke Geldkamer" (Imperial Money Chamber), acting as an exchange- and creditbank for the Company, was charged with the total purchase. This Chamber placed orders with the Company and in return gave a certain amount of trade goods, of which the most important were copper and camphor. It was a privileged commercial corporation that netted the overseas trade from the Imperial Treasury.
Feenstra Kuiper, p. 111; Mansvelt,Handelsmij.p. 198.
Beside the trade of the United Company, the so called "Kompshandel", existed the Kambang-trade or private trade, formally instituted in 1685.
The origin of the word 'Kambang' is uncertain. According to Van der Chijs, p. 391, it was derived from the Chinese word 'kan-pan', i.e. show (of goods on) shelfs, or public auction. The expression 'Kompshandel' ('Comp(any)'s trade') remained in use also after the dissolution of the United Company in 1796.
The "Heeren Zeventien" ('Gentlemen Seventeen' or the Board of Directors of the United Company) only grudgingly permitted their servants in Japan this elsewhere forbidden practice. It was desired, however, by the government of Nagasaki because the petty merchants of this town, not being able to engage in bulk trade, thus found an opportunity to take part in the retailing of the rather small invoices in the Kambang-trade. Like the 'Kompshandel' it was exactly regulated by Dutch and Japanese alike. Every dutchman on Deshima, including the captains of the ships, had a fixed share in the total turnover allowed. The restriction to a certain maximum led to extensive smuggling; the Japanese caught in the act often were executed, the Dutchmen banished from Japan.
From autumn 1826 till autumn 1829 the Kambang-trade was carried on by the "Societeit van Particuliere Handel op Japan" ('Society for the Private Trade with Japan'), a creation of the Opperhoofd G.F. Meylan.
Cf. inv.nrs. 1593-1601.
The purpose was to cut the expenses by buying and selling on joint account. Only the officials on Deshima and the captains of the ships, trading to Japan, could participate. Unfortunately, Meylan's scheme did not come up to expectations, for various reasons. From 1835 till 1855 the Kambang-trade was let out to a Batavian merchant, while the officials at Deshima got a compensation for the loss of extra income. After 1855, the Government of the Dutch Indies took charge of it. The "Kompshandel"was liquidated formally in 1857, but was continued until 1860, as was the Kambang-trade.
The "Aparte of nieuw geschikte handel" ('Seperate or newly established trade') dates from1804. The Opperhoofd Hendrik Doeff in that year agreed with the Money Chamber that the Dutch government should import some articles in special demand, such as lead, mercury and sapan-wood, in exchange for an extra amount of camphor. The credit money of the Dutch, the so-called "toegift" ('bonus') was booked on the Kambang-account.
Inv.nr. 557, G.F. Meylan to the General Audit Office at Batavia, 20 November 1829. In later years, this credit amounted to a considerable sum, because there was a shortage of Japanese camphor for export. The result is a fading away of the original difference between (Dutch) Government trade and private trade.
Under the name of "eis- en geschenkgoederen" ('goods in demand and gifts') the Dutch imported various luxury articles, books, instruments etc., which were demanded separately by the Shogun and other Japanese authorities. The demands of the Shogun were paid for on the Company-account, the others on the Kambang-account.
The titles of the accounts are varying; cf. inv.nrs. 1449d, 1450d.
These "geschenkgoederen" ("gifts") ought not to be mistaken for the real gifts to the Japanese, handed over on the occasion of the journey to the Shogunal Court.
Cf. inv.nrs. 1161-1305, 1819-1831 and the annexes to inv.nrs. 1431b, seq, 1783-1797, 1803-1818.
The Dutch took due notice of the nature and amount of the Chinese trade to Nagasaki, the Chinese being their only competitors.
In 1685, two thirds of the total import amount were allotted to the Chinese. This distribution roughly corresponded with the existing situation. Cf. Nachod, p. 389 seq.).
With the help of the Japanese, lists with data about the Chinese import and / or export were compiled every year. These lists have been incorporated for the most part in the daily records of the factory.
Cf. the note to inv.nrs. 53-249. See also inv.nrs. 661, 823, 1449g, 1572.
Prices were put in teal's ("thaylen"; "teilen"), initially a Sino-Japanese measure of weight (37,565 grammes), later a standard of value (37.565 grammes of silver). In the trade with the Dutch the so-called "Compagniestael" ('Company's teal') was used as money of account. The value of this teal in the course of years declined from 70 'stuivers' Dutch money (in the 17th century) to 32 'stuivers' (around 1800). For the Kambang-trade a special tael was put into use, which held a higher value. In 1818 the 'Kompstael' was fixed at 40 'stuivers' or 160 'duiten' Dutch Indies money, the Kambangtael at 192 'duiten'. The rate of exchange was accordingly: Dutch guilder: Dutch Indies guilder - 2 : 3, Kompstael: Dutch Indies guilder - 3: 4,8.
Nacod, p. 134 seq.; Lauts, p. 283 ; inv.nrs. 50, 660.
To close this paragraph, something must be said about the tradegoods, imported in or exported from Japan by the Dutch. In the 17th century, raw or spun silk (from China, Siam or Bengal), deerskins, ray hides (from Siam), lead, mercury and sapan-wood were the most importants imports, which were traded against silver, gold, copper, camphor and ( in lesser quantities) lacquerwork and porcelain. From the second half of the 17th century, cotton fabrics from India and several textiles from the Netherlands are of growing importance for the Japanese market. After 1668, when the export of silver was forbidden, the most important Japanese products were copper and camphor. Dutch and Indian textiles, sugar, sapan-wood, lead and tin were the principal imports down to the middle of the 19th century.
The periods 1633-1640 and 1652-1672 were extra-ordinary profitable for the Dutch. In 1636, the profit on import alone amounted to 1,5 million guilders, in 1638 it nearly reached 2,5 million guilders. The importance of the Japanese trade gradually declined, but the United Company did not abandon the factory ( although she threatened to do so several times during the 18th century) for fear that other nations would take her place. The monopoly position was very dear to the company and it was thought that in the course of time matters would change for the better. The importance of the factory after the dissolution of the United Company and the changed attitude towards Japan in the 1840's have been sketched already in par.7.